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Abstract 
In this paper we present a method of explicit inclusion of safety into a model-based design method for cyberphysical systems. 
This approach enables an analysis where component-level failures can be mapped to potential system-level hazards. Application 
of this work presents several significant advances to the fields of safety engineering and design. This paper present a method of 
representing the safety property of a system by the introduction of the concept called the  Further, the function 
of achieving safety is mapped to the performance functions of the system. We present a process of concurrently developing a 
system concept from the safety and functional perspective. The end result of this process is a system architecture where 
components of the system are explicitly mapped to both the functions they perform and the role it plays in ensuring safe system 
operation. The benefit of this approach is having a system representation that allows for analysis of critical events and off-
nominal component behavior to identify potential losses in function and safety constraint violations. The approach is 
demonstrated on a software controlled hardware system. Namely, a generic spacecraft reaction control system. 
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1. Introduction 
Maintaining a functional perspective throughout the system architecting stage is commonly accepted as 
producing the most viable and optimal designs. One advantage of the functional approach is to keep system 
designers from narrowing in on specific component solutions until the system and component interactions are well 
defined. The power of functional modeling lays in the simplicity of its purpose. A functional model serves to show 
only how a design achieves a given set of functional requirements. Only through additions to the functional 
representation can engineers begin to describe how a design will meet other types of requirements such as 
performance or safety. Further, most research in function-based methodologies has viewed satisfaction of these 
other requirement types as part of the detailed design stage. This leads to supporting the traditional approach of 
relegating safety to the design validation stage. However, recent work in systems engineering methods has focused 
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on supporting a safety-centric design process [20, 17]. The perspective of these approaches is that safety should be a 
driver for design. Thus the objective of this paper is to introduce a safety-centric method of developing a design 
based on the functional modeling paradigm. 
2. Background 
Standard practices in industry for ensuring safety in the design of complex systems incorporates one or more of 
the following approaches. A design review centered process requires that design iterations and decisions pass 
through a panel of certifying experts to ensure that known safety issues are addresses and to rapidly identify new 
issues. This type of process requires a significant investment in project management and expertise to avoid long 
design delays and unforeseen interactions. A validation approach utilizes a strategic selection of tests to validate safe 
system performance to some acceptable degree of uncertainty. This approach is often used for software intensive 
systems. A certification process requires that a set of analysis tools are applied to a design such as Failure Modes 
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) or Probabilistic Risk Assessment by system safety experts to provide evidence for a 
certifying authority. While there are some early adaptations of these types of approaches to the design development 
stage, the work presented uniquely presents a method of generating designs from the safe design space rather than 
checking safety-related violations of established designs. These traditional practices should be enhanced through the 
explicit mapping of safety found in this work. The following sections summarize the technical basis for this safety-
based functional system design methodology.  
 
2.1. The Functional Design Paradigm  
 
In the majority of research literature, functional modeling begins with an object-centered view of functions [19, 
24, 23, 30, 6, 5, 21, 4]. That is, a function is part of the action that some component or set of components in the 
system performs. This understanding of function leads to viewing functions as verbs acting on flows of energy 
material and signal as nouns. Further, functional descriptions can be understood as input-output relationships of 
black boxes. This is the basis for generating function block diagrams. In the case of Bracewell and Sharpe, their 
bond graph inspired approach has functions acting on both effort and flow [2]. These methods tend to follow the 
-function-in- [5], in that all the functions the system performs should 
be captured in the functional model and no functionality is implied or inherited through the connectivity. Though 
some argue that this principle is largely unattainable in real systems [14], the principle as a goal serves to lead to a 
modular approach. This modular approach allows functions to be linked directly to components [1] and enables 
design decision making based on selecting from a variety of potential function solutions (components) [3]. 
In contrast to the object-centric view of function, the effect (or process)  view understands functions as the set of 
physical principles used to achieve an intended goal. In this perspective the direct result of developing the functional 
model is the identification of the intended behaviors needed to achieve the desired functions. The Function-
Behavior-State modeling scheme of Umeda et al. [25, 26, 28, 27, 22, 31], the Function-Behavior-Structure of Gero 
et al. [10, 11], Qualitative Process Theory of Forbus [9], and the functional ontology presented by Keuneke [15] are 
all examples of the effect or process view of function. 
One of the benefits of this approach is that, because 
behavior is the intermediary between functions and 
components, novel and redundant functionality can be 
identified through finding associated behavior [29]. 
Rather than being at different abstractions levels, 
these two perspectives describe the same system 
teleological perspective). Figure 1 illustrates how these 
two views of function result in a different sequence of 
design refinement. Figure 1. Contrasting the two views of function commonly found in research literature. 
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For this research, both views of function are adopted in different ways. The object or device view of function is 
adopted for software and hardware component architecture representations. This view of function is chosen because 
the behavior is derived from the components used. For nominal behavior, either perspective may arrive at similar 
system behavioral representations. However, the goal of this research is to evaluate the safety of a system under 
critical event scenarios involving one or more component failures. Functions are intermediaries between intention 
and reality and have no physical existence and thus cannot have failure modes. When a failure in a system occurs, it 
is the components which behave differently not the functions. From this need to evaluate the functional impact as a 
result of behavior of a system in critical scenarios, the device view of function is used for developing the system 
component connection architecture. However, this research proposes using an additional view of the system defined 
erty of a system to resist moving from a hazardous state 
 
The key difference between these two understandings of function is related to the formulation of behavior. As 
mentioned, the device view uses an input-process-output formulation. This research assumes that following some 
functional basis such as Hirtz et al. [12] and using a library of component behavioral models, a system simulation 
can be generated early in the design stage. Similar to the Functional Basis mentioned above, Keuneke developed an 
ontology based on an effect understanding of function [15]. Two of the 4 categories of function are adopted from 
that work to describe the types of safety functions. Namely, To Prevent  and To Maintain.  
2.2. Safety Analysis in Design 
The Systems Theoretic Process and hazard Analysis (STPA) developed by Dulac and Leveson [7, 17] is a 
method for identifying and mitigating the causal factors of an accident based on the STAMP model [16] of accident 
causality. STAMP is a model of system failure that proposes that all systems move into accident states when safety 
constraints of the socio-technical control structure are violated. Using this mode the STPA method is a design 
process centered on representing the control structure of a system and identifying how any of the four types of 
unsafe control actions can occur. In [17], Leveson describes the four types of unsafe control actions as: 
 
1. A control action required for safety is not provided or is not followed. 
2. An unsafe control action is provided that leads to a hazard. 
3. A potentially safe control action is provided too late, too early or out of sequence. 
4. A safe control action is stopped too soon (for continuous or non-discrete control actions). 
 
The STPA method begins with identifying the control structure to mitigate a potential hazard. Next, the method 
provides a generic list of control structure failure modes (called causal factors in [17]) which might lead to one of 
the four types of unsafe control actions listed above. Finally, using the control structure model and the identified 
factors as a guide, designers are led to develop and investigate scenarios that might lead to these factors occurring. 
Thus incorporating this into a design decision making process involves making changes based on what mitigates the 
existence or impact of these factors.  
This research adopts a similar top-down view of safety as a system property as is found in the STPA method. We 
propose a concurrent safety-based control structure design with the device-centric functional design. Instead of 
expert judgment in STPA to identify scenarios, this research proposes a model to identify triggers of the causal 
factors through system simulation. Considering the successful use of expert-based methods such as Fault Trees and 
HAZOP, this research is focused on automating the design decision-making process with respect to safety. It is not 
attempting to replace the important role played by system safety experts but rather augment this process with 
behavioral simulation. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Safety Centric Design 
Following the Systems Theoretic Accident Model [16], the transition from hazardous state to accident (or 
mishap) state occurs when a system safety constrain is violated. Therefore, a measure of safety for a system is the 
relative difficulty (or likelihood) for those constraints to be violated. To enable design-stage decision making this 
metric of safety must be evaluated early in the design cycle to provide the greatest benefit to designers. In a model-
based design framework this indicates a need to explicitly represent the system property of safety. 
behavior of a system that inhibits the system state transition from hazardous to mishap. In this way the safety 
function is 
that when a system is in a hazardous state it can only transition into the mishap state if the safety function is lost or 
otherwise ineffective. It is this property of the safety function that enables safety-based design evaluation. Thus, the 
first goal of this work is to develop a method of representing the safety functions as part of the design. 
The word function is used because, similar to the way that functions are the actions of what a system does, safety 
functions are a type of action. Using part of the Keuneke function ontology [15], safety functions either maintain the 
system state or prevent the system transition. While the functions of the system can be decomposed into sub- 
functions and function structures, this is not the case for the safety function. Where a component type function acts 
on a flow to exhibit some behavior, the safety function reflects a behavior at the system level. Further, this behavior 
only exists at the system level and cannot be decomposed into sub-safety functions. The safety function follows an 
effect view of function, representing a phenomena and not an input-output relation. 
The identification of safety functions should occur at the early system design stage. After a Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis (PHA), system designers should have a list of expected hazardous system states. The established approach 
in industry for conducting a PHA utilizes hazard identification causation lists to guide designers in identifying 
hazardous system states [8]. A hazardous system state is description of the system and its environment that has the 
potential for becoming an accident. This list should grow as the design becomes more refined, however the 
identification of safety functions can begin with this list. The development of this list is left to expert knowledge of 
the system and its potential operating en
type of analysis. For example, if a car is operated at night and the driver cannot see then the car may hit something. 
In this example, the car and driver is the system and its operating environment is at night. The hazardous state is not 
being able to see in this operating environment. The first stage in a safety guided design process is to attempt to 
eliminate hazardous states. However, this cannot always be done with a high degree of certainty or is undesirable. 
One way to avoid the example hazardous state is to make it impossible to drive vehicles as night (undesirable) or 
provide headlights (the state probability is only reduced). Thus, the desired safety function is to prevent the vehicle 
from hitting anything when the car-person system is in this hazardous state. In this example, the person is the 
controller and this safety function is typically implemented by the driver stopping the vehicle. This safety function 
would need to be explicitly implemented in an autonomous vehicle. 
In this way, a desired safety function is identified 
for every hazard to mishap transition. Each safety 
function is implemented in the system design with a 
control structure. This control structure is not the 
entire system control scheme (which implements many 
safety functions), but rather one specific loop focused 
on mitigating the hazard. As seen in Figure 2, a control 
structure has four elements. Namely, the controller 
which directs the actuators to allow a desired process 
which is monitored with sensors. Using the previous 
vehicle example, the human controller actuates the 
braking process and observes through sensors both the 
arrival of the hazardous state and the result of 
Figure 2. Safety Functions are implemented by control structures are the 
characteristic of the system to avoid moving from a hazardous state to a 
mishap state. 
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actuating the braking process. As evident from the example, the parts of the control structure are real components 
(either physical or cyber) that exist in the system. In this way, we can connect the function-based cyberphysical 
architecture design to safety functions though the physical components which implement those safety functions. 
 
3.2. Incorporating Safety Functions into Model-Based, Functional System Design 
As discussed in section 2.1, there exists in the literature a variety of tools and methods for both model-based 
design and function-based system design. This section illustrates adding the representation of safety functions into 
one approach to system design and using a particular set of tools. Specifically, we follow a device-centric view of 
functional system design [19, 13, 12, 3], where high-level system functions are decomposed into functions structures 
of functions acting on flows. Based on this structure, generalized components are identified to implement those 
functions and the architecture of those components represents the cyberphysical design. Further, we use the systems 
modeling language (SysML) [18] to express these design representations. Using other methods and tools may 
require minor modifications of the following steps, however, the main concept is broadly applicable. 
The safety-centric design process is as follows: 
 
1. Identify the set of hazard-to-mishap transitions that will require implementing safety functions. These 
transitions come from a preliminary hazard analysis conducted at the system level. 
2. Generate the generalized control structure representation for implementing each safety function. 
3. Follow the functional design process to decompose high-level functions into an implementable function 
structure. 
4. Generate a system design architecture by implementing each function with one or more general 
components.  
5. Identify the components in the cyberphysical architecture that correspond to the general elements for each 
safety function. 
6. Use this mapping to generate the detailed control structure for each safety function. 
4. Example Application 
As an illustrative example, consider the early design of a maneuvering system for a satellite. One of the key 
features of this system is that it is composed of multiple technology domains. This design requires a controlled 
electrically driven thruster. Further, this system needs to be capable of manual and autonomous operation. Thus this 
system is composed of subsystems containing electrical, mechanical, thermal-fluids and software control. This 
conceptual design demonstrates that the emergent property of safety at the system level is often a result of multiple 
subsystem behaviors.   
For this work, the SysML block definition diagrams (BDD) and internal block diagrams (IBD) are used to 
represent the functions and components of the system. In these diagrams there are blocks representing either 
functions or components (or component classes) and arcs connecting these blocks expressing some type of relation. 
There are multiple relations in the SysML specifications, however, for this example we will only use three. The first 
type of relation is a directed composition. This type of relation specifies that one block is composed of the connected 
blocks.  Figure 3 is a BDD illustrating the elements of the generic control structure and how they together make up 
the complete control structure. The second type of relation is used for requirements and indicates that a component 
satisfies a requirement. This relation can be seen in Figure 3 indicating the safety function that is satisfied by this 
control structure. The BDD shows the relation of parts to the whole but not the connection of parts to each other. 
The IBD is used to show how parts of the design relate to one another. Here the third type of relation is used to link 
blocks together to indicate the transfer of material, energy, or signal. 
This design process assumes that the functional requirements and PHA have been generated. The identification of 
the safety function from the desired hazard mitigation follows the process identified in the previous section, 
assigning a generic structure like the one in Figure 2. This is the explicit representation of the safety property of the 
system. For this example, we assume that a potential system hazard state is defined as the system operating under 
manual control. The potential mishap state is that the craft may lose (to a point of no return) the planned orbital 
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trajectory. Therefore, the designers intend to implement a safety function to prevent this transition. This safety 
function and the generic control structure component types which implement it are represented in a BDD (see Figure 
3).  
The next step is the functional design of the system. A high level functional decomposition is represented in the 
BDD in Figure 4. Further each of the functional blocks will interact with each other. This high-level functional 
structure is illustrated in the IBD of Figure 5. From this diagram it can be seen that the electrical power system 
provides the electrical power for the controller software to operate as well as the power for rocket controlling 
actuators. The rocket provides thrust to the system and the controller will receive status and send control signals to 
the other blocks as wells as receive and send signals to the operator. The individual subsystems are further 
decomposed into an implementable function structure.  Figure 6 illustrates the BDD showing the components that 
are chosen to implement the electrical power subsystem. The system architecture is based on the function structure 
which is also represented as an IBD (not shown for space restrictions). Likewise the rocket subsystem functional 
structure and component architecture can also be depicted. From these models the overall maneuvering system 
design is formed. The maneuvering controller (which operates on hardware powered by the electrical system) uses 
the electrical subsystem to control the fuel and oxidizer valves of the rocket subsystem. This represents one possible 
design solution for this system. One important point that can be seen in the electrical power subsystem design in  
Figure 3. A SysML block definition diagram illustrating the composition of the control structure for 
operator control. 
Figure 5. A SysML internal block diagram illustrating the function 
structure of the spacecraft maneuvering system. 
Figure 4. A SysML block definition diagram illustrating the parts 
composing the spacecraft maneuvering system. 
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Figure 5 is that this system provides electrical power to other subsystems not considered in this example. This 
reflects the reality that subsystems perform multiple functions and further that behavior of one subsystem cannot be 
considered entirely apart from other subsystems. This system has a suite of sensors in the electrical and rocket 
subsystems that the controller can use to determine the current state. 
The next step is identifying what components implement the specific safety function control structure. As 
mentioned previously, this model does not reflect the entire control schema but just the safety function 
implementation. At the high-level the function structure of Figure 4 can be used to define the connections in the IBD 
of the safety function control structure. This is shown in Figure 3. This is further refined based on the components 
used in the cyberphysical structure diagrams to a detailed safety control structure. In this example (see Figure 7), 
implementing the safety function that prevents the loss of orbital trajectory requires components from all three 
subsystems. These components are not all physically connected, however, they form a structure for performing the 
safety function at the system level. In this way, the safety function control structure provides a different view of the 
same system as the cyberphysical structural diagrams. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. A SysML block definition diagram illustrating the composition of the electrical power subsystem. 
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5. Discussion 
This example application has detailed a segment of the design process for connecting the system safety 
property with the functional members with the presented methodology. What can be seen through this process is that 
the low level sub-functions within diverse technical subsystems contribute to the effectiveness of the safety function.  
For comparison, a functional Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) technique utilize expert knowledge to 
predict fault propagation. Using this approach the high level effect of those functional effects is explicit based on the 
model. That is not to say that there may not be additional functional effects from those low level failures. In fact, a 
there may be other low-level functional failures not explicitly mapped to the safety function which still cause a loss 
of the safety because they affect the sub-functions that are connected. One method for identify these secondary 
functional failures is to simulate system behaviour under failure scenarios.  
This approach connects the top-down system perspective as well as the bottom-up failure causes analysis. 
For example, based on the mapping that is represented in Figure 7, a Fault Tree can be readily constructed that lists 
all function affecting faults for the mapped components as branches for the main event of the loss of the safety 
function. Alternatively, using a simulation approach or expert knowledge low level faults can be identified if they 
affect the components that form the safety structure. For example, a battery fault affects the function of the relays 
that form part of the safety structure. Therefore, the consequence of these low level faults can be mapped to their 
system significance, aiding the construction of an FMEA or other bottom-up assessment tool. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we demonstrated a method of safety-based design where the system property of safety is explicitly 
modeled in the design process. This process uses the functional design process as a model for the design using 
safety functions . Safety functions perform one of two roles in the system. They either prevent the system state 
Figure 7. A SysML block definition diagram illustrating the composition of the control 
structure after mapping to the components from the functional design process. 
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transition from hazard to mishap or maintain the current system state. In the same way that functions are 
implemented with components in the functional design process, this chapter shows how safety functions are 
implemented with control structures. As evident by the example of the satellite maneuvering system, the 
components that form the safety function control structure are often found in different subsystems and are not 
directly connected in the physical architecture.  
The main outcome of following this approach is the explicit mapping between components in the system and the 
execution of safety functions. This has limited impact by itself. What has been presented in this paper does not 
answer the question of how well the safety function is implemented in this particular design. Instead this paper forms 
the foundation for how reasoning on component behavior can be linked directly to hazard mitigation. The next stage 
of this research is to assess how component behavioral simulation and failure reasoning can be used to evaluate 
designs to answer the how well question. 
The first assumption for this process is that the safety function is lost or inoperative when there is a failure in the 
control structure. This is based on the STAMP accident model [17]. Therefore, the consequence of any behavior in 
the system that causes a failure of the safety function control structure is the loss of mitigation for that specific 
hazard. Thus the mapping presented in this chapter enables the link between component fault analysis and system 
hazard analysis.  
One approach to evaluating a design based on this safety function control structure is to look at the reliability of 
the components implementing the control structure. While this would provide a preliminary analysis, it does not 
address failures (or behaviors) that are not part of the control structure but affect the components within it. Thus the 
focus of future research is a behavior simulation approach where the impact of faults and critical scenarios is 
evaluated in terms of the effect to component and safety functions. This evaluation can be made through functional 
failure reasoning, where logical rules are used to evaluate the simulated system behavior to identify the operating 
state of both the component type functions and the system safety functions. 
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